Detecting and understanding non-compliance with conservation rules  by Solomon, Jennifer N. et al.
Biological Conservation 189 (2015) 1–4Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Biological Conservation
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate /bioconEditorialDetecting and understanding non-compliance with conservation ruleshttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biocon.2015.04.028
0006-3207/ 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 970 491 1585.
E-mail addresses: jennifer.solomon@colostate.edu (J.N. Solomon), Michael.
gavin@colostate.edu (M.C. Gavin), gorem@msu.edu (M.L. Gore).Jennifer N. Solomon a,⇑, Michael C. Gavin a,c, Meredith L. Gore b
aColorado State University, Department of Human Dimensions of Natural Resources, Warner College of Natural Resources, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1480, USA
bMichigan State University, Department of Fisheries and Wildlife, School of Criminal Justice, AgBioResearch, Natural Resources Building, 480 Wilson Road, Room 13, East Lansing,
MI 48824, USA
c School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
a r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 2 April 2015
Received in revised form 12 April 2015
Accepted 23 April 2015
Available online 23 May 2015
Keywords:
Compliance
Conservation
Illegal
Illicit
Methods
Natural resources
Non-compliance
Rulesa b s t r a c t
This paper establishes the context for the special issue, ‘‘Detecting and Understanding Violations of
Conservation Rules’’. Illicit or non-compliant human behaviors may occur in all ecosystems and range
from subsistence illegal resource collection to poaching by organized criminal syndicates. Such acts have
an enormous impact on social–ecological systems, but monitoring non-compliance is challenging,
primarily because the topic is sensitive and victims are voiceless. The future of many conservation areas
depends upon compliance with conservation rules. However, with a growing human population,
consumptive societies, and rapid expansion of business opportunities fueled by new technology, there
is little doubt that demand will remain steady or increase for many of our natural resources. We outline
major conservation compliance issues and impacts, and review models and methods used to monitor and
respond to the problem for both subsistence and commercial non-compliance.
 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.1. Non-compliance with conservation rules
Human behavior, particularly compliance, is a central compo-
nent of conservation programs (Gore, 2011). Compliance with
conservation rules (e.g., no hunting, no ﬁrewood extraction) is
critical to the success of any conservation project, regardless of
the scale of the conservation actions, the categories of biodiversity
the project focuses on, or the means of conservation governance
(Kahler and Gore, 2012). Non-compliance with conservation rules
(i.e., rule violations) can undermine conservation goals, and have
wide-ranging impacts on the social–ecological systems in which
all conservation actions are embedded.
Non-compliance in biodiversity conservation is a global chal-
lenge, one that is growing increasingly complex and attracting
the attention of a wider array of scholars and practitioners from
the conservation ﬁeld. For example, the United Nations identiﬁed
the current magnitude and scale of illegal and illicit exploitation
of natural resources as an environmental crime crisis (Nellemann
et al., 2014). Current research and practice on reducing
non-compliance and increasing compliance draws on diversedisciplines, including economics, psychology, ecology, political
science, risk and decision sciences and sociology. Some disciplines
use the terms conservation criminology (Gibbs et al., 2010), green
criminology (White and Heckenberg, 2014) or environmental
crime (White, 2009). However, regardless of the disciplinary orien-
tation, more applied research is needed (Arias, 2015; Gavin et al.,
2010; Gore, 2011).
Non-compliance with conservation regulations can constitute a
threat to conservation goals in every biome on the planet (Gavin
et al., 2010), and impacts conservation programs ranging from pro-
tected areas (Hilborn et al., 2006; Yonariza and Webb, 2007) to
endangered species (Burton, 1999; Dinerstein et al., 2007; Koch
et al., 2006). The biological impacts of non-compliance range from
genetic to ecosystem scales. For example, the illegal stocking of ﬁsh
(i.e. the placement of ﬁsh into aquatic ecosystems against regula-
tions), may result in negative impacts, such as the spread of zoono-
tic disease or impacts on genetic diversity via hybridization and
introgression (Canonico et al., 2005; Johnson et al., 2009). In addi-
tion, the global illegal trade in natural resources, or noncompliance
with international policy agreements such as the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), is among the
world’s most proﬁtable illicit activities (Haken, 2011; White and
Heckenberg, 2014; Wyatt, 2013). Illegal trade affects hundreds of
millions of individual plants and animals from tens of thousands
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endangerment of ﬂagship species such as elephants and rhino-
ceroses. Non-compliance can also result in negative impacts to
ecosystems. For example, illegal and illicit logging in protected
forest areas has been linked to half the deforestation in tropical
countries (Lee et al., 2015).
Non-compliance with conservation rules can have substantial
socio-economic impacts. Although many populations rely upon
illegal extraction of resources for their livelihoods, others receive
substantial income from illegal poaching and trade (Pratt et al.,
2004; Tacconi, 2008; Yonariza and Webb, 2007). Illegal resource
users may also deplete opportunities for legal users to beneﬁt from
natural resources (Kahler et al., 2013), for example through
reduced access to food to meet dietary needs and reduced legally
harvestable resources available for subsistence, commercial, cul-
tural, or recreational purposes (Sethi and Hilborn, 2008).
Non-compliance with conservation rules has also been linked to
social conﬂicts both over access to resources and as a means for
ﬁnancing war (Brashares et al., 2014).2. Measuring, monitoring and managing non-compliance
Conservation occurs within complex and dynamic social–
ecological systems (Liu et al., 2007). Numerous factors interact to
inﬂuence the location, timing, and scale of non-compliant behav-
iors (Arias, 2015; Gavin et al., 2010; Kahler and Gore, 2012). In
turn, adaptive management approaches may provide one effective
means of encouraging increased compliance with regulations
(Keane et al., 2008). Adaptive management frameworks allow for
experimentation with a variety of interventions aimed at bolster-
ing compliance; and, via learning and feedback, can adjust
management actions over time as managers gain a better under-
standing of the factors contributing to non-compliance, or as the
key drivers of these behaviors change (Salafsky et al., 2001).
Designing conservation interventions that encourage compli-
ance and monitor the impacts of management actions requires at
a minimum accurate data that tracks what non-compliant activi-
ties occur, where they occur, when they occur, who is involved,
and why they undertake these activities (Gavin et al., 2010). The
last of these questions, why non-compliance behavior occurs, is
critical (Arias, 2015) for conservation interventions, just as is
understanding why compliance occurs. Understanding the drivers
of non-compliance and compliance contributes insight into the
design of more effective management interventions. It is important
to note that drivers and motivations for non-compliance may be
different than those for compliance (Arias, 2015; Kahler and
Gore, 2012). The range of motivations of an individual’s conserva-
tion behavior is wide and complex, can vary from one individual to
another, and, even within the same individual, may change across
different contexts and for different behaviors (Kahler and Gore,
2012; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002). In addition, drivers manifest
at different levels, including the individual level (e.g. attitudes
towards resources or regulatory agencies can inﬂuence behavior),
the group level (e.g., social norms), and the institutional level
(e.g., the effectiveness of an agency to enforce regulations)
(Manfredo et al., 2014). In attempting to unravel the web of causal-
ity of non-compliant behaviors, conservation researchers and
managers can beneﬁt from the long history of relevant research
from the diverse disciplines discussed above. Each of these ﬁelds
has developed a unique set of theories and methodological
approaches for the study of sensitive and often illicit activities.
However, conservation has only recently begun to recognize many
of the existing tools and lessons of the past are not wholly applica-
ble to the contemporary study of compliance and non-compliance
with conservation rules.Obtaining reliable answers to the sensitive questions surround-
ing non-compliance presents unique challenges (Solomon et al.,
2007). The sensitive nature of non-compliant behavior, including
fear of retribution, often reduces the likelihood that rule violators
will self-report, and increases the chance that violators will refuse
to answer questions about non-compliance or will withhold or
misreport information (Solomon et al., 2007). Gavin et al. (2010)
reviewed eight different approaches to gathering information on
non-compliance in conservation: law-enforcement records,
indirect observation, self-reporting, direct observation, direct
questioning, indirect questioning (e.g., the randomized response
technique), forensics, and modeling. Each of these methods
offers advantages, but also pose distinct shortcomings, particu-
larly for the analysis of drivers of non-compliance. For example,
direct questioning and self-reporting tend to suffer from
under-reporting and heavy biases, whereas indirect evidence,
forensics, and enforcement records do not provide any information
regarding the potential drivers of behavior. In recent years, much
of the research on non-compliance in conservation has focused
on the development of new or integrated methodological
approaches.
Obtaining accurate answers to the what, who, where, when, and
why of non-compliance can help guide the design of more effective
conservation interventions. A diverse set of possible interventions
exists, and choosing the intervention that best addresses the main
drivers of non-compliant behavior will increase the chances of
success. For example, a communication-based intervention may
be effective when rules are not understood or to increase
knowledge about the environmental impact of particular behaviors
(Leisher et al., 2012). However, when social norms are a critical
driver of behavior, social marketing campaigns may better inﬂu-
ence behavior (McKenzie-Mohr et al., 2012). Managers also turn
toward coercive interventions, such as changing key enforcement
variables, including the chance of being caught, the probability of
prosecution and conviction, or the size of the penalties (Arias,
2015). Rule violators may be acting based on their perceptions of
the legitimacy of the rules in place, which can be affected by
several factors, including the degree to which resource users have
been involved in rule formation (Pollnac et al., 2010). To date the
literature evaluating the effectiveness of different interventions
for curbing non-compliance in conservation has been very limited
(Gore et al., 2008), perhaps because evaluation requires both a
means of accurately assessing non-compliance and longitudinal
data. This special issue examines a few different interventions
aimed at increasing compliance, and these studies may provide a
template for future work on this topic.
Overall, a complex suite of possible interventions exists, each
suited to address a different set of drivers of compliance behavior.
In many instances, interventions may also lead to unpredictable
outcomes (Gore et al., 2008). For example, increased enforcement
may also increase resentment and undermine the perceived legit-
imacy of authorities, or the provision of alternatives or incentives
may draw more resource users to a location. As each context is
unique and in ﬂux, no one approach permanently resolves
non-compliance issues in conservation (Ostrom, 2007). In turn,
continuous innovation and monitoring of progress with compli-
ance will be needed to achieve conservation objectives. This special
issue proﬁles some of these efforts.3. This special issue
Our motivation to pursue a special issue on non-compliance in
conservation resulted from the organized session entitled
‘‘Detecting, Understanding and Deterring Conservation Crime’’
held during the 26th International Congress for Conservation
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new ways of thinking about mechanisms to reduce
non-compliance and increase compliance with conservation rules.
This special issue represents one outcome of that session, and is
intended to document emerging knowledge about conservation
non-compliance and provoke new ways of thinking to address
future challenges.
Over the course of supervising the scientiﬁc review process for
this special issue, an interesting and important theme emerged,
particularly regarding the word criminal. In many of the case
studies proﬁled within this issue, we recognized individuals not
complying with regulations are often doing so for reasons linked
to local livelihoods – in many cases subsistence. Labeling individu-
als engaging in resource-extracting behaviors in order to maintain
basic livelihood functions as criminals, especially when in many
places they were displaced, not consulted or did not participate
in conservation actions in the ﬁrst place, invokes a number of
ethical and moral quagmires (Duffy, 2010). It is not our intention
to further foster a discourse that labels such people as criminals,
although we recognize the policy and criminal justice communities
increasingly consider non-compliant behavior to be criminal and
those engaging in such behavior as criminals (e.g., United States
National Strategy for Combatting Wildlife Trafﬁcking, 2014).
The articles presented in this special issue are designed to
inform discussion about current trends and new ways of thinking
about non-compliance in conservation; our goal is to highlight
accurate tools that can help formulate conservation priorities and
evaluate conservation programs to reduce the negative effects of
resource-extracting behaviors. The discourses on conservation
compliance are advancing rapidly and we believe dedicated atten-
tion must be paid to the terminology used to depict the challenges
compliance issues create, as these words also have the power to
reﬂect the (im)balances of power inherent in different forms of
conservation action.
This special issue brings together ten papers that shed light on
various challenges confronting the conservation community in
regards to non-compliance of regulations associated with
wild ﬂora and fauna. The articles in this special issue fall under
three main categories: methodological advances for measuring
and monitoring non-compliance, understanding drivers of
non-compliant behavior, and investigating the effectiveness of
policy and management interventions aimed at increasing compli-
ance. The ﬁrst three papers are largely focused on innovative
methodologies to obtain accurate estimates of non-compliance at
local levels. Nuno and St. John (2014) provide a review of special-
ized questioning techniques for survey work. Conteh et al. (2015)
with a case study from a protected area in Sierra Leone, present
a new technique, the quantitative randomized response technique
that provides a new means of more accurately quantifying the
amount of resources illegally extracted conservation areas.
Thomas et al. (2015) test the effectiveness of two indirect ques-
tioning methods, the randomized response technique and the item
count technique, when compared with conventional direct ques-
tioning, in estimates of non-compliance with recreational ﬁshing
regulations in New Zealand’s blue cod ﬁshery. These papers all
highlight the recent application of a suite of indirect questioning
methods, and the power of these approaches to provide more
accurate data on non-compliance than common survey methods.
Kretser et al. (2015) outline emerging digital technologies
that can be helpful in the identiﬁcation of illegally traded wildlife
and wildlife products. Petrossian (2015) applies the situational
crime prevention framework from criminology to preventing ille-
gal, unreported, and unregulated ﬁshing. His article delineates
the relationship between situational factors and illegal ﬁshing as
well as using spatial statistics to explore changes in illegal ﬁshing
in space.Two papers discuss attitudes and policies related to
non-compliance; Kahler and Gore (2015) examine perceived
poaching related risk in Namibia and Browne-Nuñez et al. (2015)
use focus groups and anonymous questionnaires concerning
wolves in the U.S. Two papers focus on management and policy
related to ﬁsheries. Lewis (2015) examines the effectiveness of
management interventions with the red abalone ﬁshery in the
U.S. using the randomized response technique and Sjöstedt and
Sundström (2015) provide perspective on institutional arrange-
ments in South Africa and Namibia. The special issue concludes
with an examination of identifying drivers of non-compliance.
St. John et al. (2015) work on carnivores in Taiwan using the
randomized response technique, direct questioning and
models demonstrates how potential interventions relate to
non-compliant behavior.
We hope these papers provide a picture of the current state of
much of the research on non-compliance in conservation.
Although this issue highlights many recent advances, it also points
to the clear need for much more work to further hone methods to
study non-compliance, to understand drivers of these behaviors
and to develop management frameworks that can test different
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